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Abstract 
Developmental economists refer to South Korea's economic "miracle" - 
contrary to North Korea's economic disaster - as a shining example that 
glorifies the ultimate victory of American capitalism. It is precisely that logic 
in which many people hasten to call direct U.S. interventions in third world 
nations during the Cold War a function of imperialism. After all, unlike the 
European model of imperialism, American involvement in Korea ultimately 
benefited both sides. The purpose of this paper is to uncover the truth, 
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often covered under decades of Cold War rhetoric. For example, while 
Americans did not "colonize" Korea, Americans fundamentally altered the 
historical fate of Korea. It was precisely the State Department's paranoia of 
"Red Expansion" that triggered the division of Korea, which created a 
breeding ground for friction that would develop into one of the bloodiest 
armed conflicts in human history - The Korean War. In the end, it was the 
Koreans, among other citizens of the "hot" regions around the globe, who 
disproportionately paid the price for the Cold War.  
Introduction  
American history prides itself on the liberties and freedom guaranteed under 
the “exceptional” nature of American democracy. Evident in the Declaration of 
Independence, this notion has roots in the early American disgust with the 
corrupted “old” world (Stephanson 4). Despite this seemingly firm belief in an 
idealized vision of freedom and equality, a contradictory nature of American 
foreign policy emerged during the Cold War. Although not widely known, the 
United States, for example, played an integral role in installing a series of 
authoritarian right-wing regimes in South Korea throughout the latter half of the 
20th century (Cumings 355). The so-called American “containment strategy” in 
Korea was only one of the widely deployed American foreign policy tactics of 
the Cold War, which aimed at restraining communist movements with whatever 
means necessary.  
While there appears to be a contradiction between the core American 
values of freedom and democracy and the U.S. Cold War strategies, a closer 
examination of the “subjects” of American ideology suggests that the American 
cold war policy was not a mere lip service used in times of need. While 
installing right-wing dictators in Korea went against the democratic principles of 
America, the sacrifice of Koreans' freedom and democracy was overlooked for 
the sake of preserving America's liberties and freedom. After all, Americans 
saw the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to their exceptional “way of life.” This 
was especially true given that the culture of Red Scare diffused a pandemic 
fear among Americans that leftist regimes would win over the world without 
U.S. intervention. The American economy, which heavily depended upon open 
access to world economy, also added incentive to install right-wing regimes 
around the globe. Without having to formerly govern a nation, the right-wing 
regimes in Korea – who were often military dictators – served as viable tool for 
Americans when it came to suppressing the left and promoting liberal 
capitalism. Finally, American intervention in Korea was legitimized by the 
manifestation of Orientalism, which provided the United States with the 
justification necessary to apply different standards to “different” people. 
Throughout the history of America, the emphasis placed on preserving the 
exceptionalist ideological foundation for “white” Americans – intermingled with 
geo-political, economic, and ideological factors – rationalized the costly and 
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paradoxical nature of American intervention in Korea during the Cold War.  
The Soviet Union as an Ideological Threat  
The American intervention in Korea was embarked under a banner of 
preserving the “American way of life.” In order to understand why the United 
States perceived the expansion of Soviet Union as a big threat – and not the 
western colonial powers, who dominated the world in the 19th and early 20th 
century – it is necessary to grasp the founding ideologies at the inception of 
American nationhood. From the first-hand experience with “tyrannical” rulings 
under the British Empire, early Americans placed a great emphasis on securing 
individual liberty and liberal capitalism (Stephanson 15). That vision was guided 
by protestant millennialism, which led Americans to proclaim themselves as the 
“chosen people” to carry out God's mission to eradicate corruption. America 
was paralleled to a “City upon a Hill,” as John Winthrop puts it, “[that] shall be 
made a story and a byword through the world” (Winthrop).  
The religious foundations of the society, which viewed the Soviet's atheism 
as polar opposite to the United States, necessarily compelled the United States 
to be paranoid at Soviet advancement. The NSC documents, for example, 
suggest that Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, “[was] 
animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its 
absolute authority over the rest of the world” (May 25). This discourse was 
widely dispersed to ordinary Americans through the culture of the Red Scare. In 
everyday life, Americans encountered articles from magazines like Look, where 
religious adjectives like “sinister” and “serpentine” were frequently used to 
portray the Soviets. (Metcalfe). As the “chosen” people of God, it was almost 
seen as a duty for Americans to embark on a global crusade against 
communism. Living an everyday life of Red Scare, many Americans in the 
1950s feared they were “losing” Asia just as they had “lost” China. This intense 
fear of loss fueled an almost obsessive public desire that centered on securing 
the allegiance of decolonizing nations and binding them to America (Klein 27).  
The struggle against communism was further justified by the Cold War 
language that depicted the Soviet Union as an “empire,” which preyed upon a 
general loathing of authoritarian dominance. As a primary illustration, the NSC 
68 cites the “concentration camp” to depict the Soviet Union as a “slave” state, 
whose sole mission is to extend by coercion through “eliminating any effective 
opposition to their authority” (May 26). While there are disputes as to whether 
or not the North Korean invasion of South Korea during the Korean War was 
prompted by an order from Stalin, the attack was widely perceived by top U.S. 
officials at the time as the launch of Soviet aggression (Cumings 260, Matray 
25). Since they interpreted the attack as Soviet Empire expansion, the 
American intervention to rescue South Korea was, ironically, understood as an 
“anti-colonial” effort, aimed at building a defense-wall for freedom. In fact, the 
underlying mission of the Truman Doctrine, according to Ernest May, was to, 
“support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by outside 
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pressures” (May 2). Under such framework of thinking, a lack of intervention 
to support anti-communist movements would have been labeled “soft on crime,” 
which was politically detrimental during the age of McCarthyism (McCann 220). 
This intense fear of loss fueled an almost obsessive public desire that centered 
on securing the allegiance of decolonizing nations and binding them to America 
(Klein 27). 
The Political Economy of Hegemony  
In a bi-polar world, the economic well-being of a nation is intricately linked 
with security of that nation. This notion is well explained by Joanne Gowa's 
security externalities thesis, which argues that economic engagement between 
two states can affect not only real income but also the security of the state 
concerned. Essentially, economic engagement between two states increases 
potential military power for the nations involved in it, and in doing so, it can 
disrupt the preexisting balance of power among the contracting states (Gowa 
1246). In the bi-polar world created by the Soviet-American conflict, initial 
choice of an alliance partner was thus explicitly linked with the economic and 
security well-being of the United States. Stabilizing South Korea's political 
economy, for instance, was an important objective that would provide the 
United States with the strategic flexibility to disengage from the peninsula (Lee, 
Stevens 31). Thus, giving monetary and military aid to Korea was economically 
rational, since the more economic growth Korea experienced, the more 
potential military power it could contribute to the American side.  
The discourse of the Domino Theory, which hypothesized that one fall 
would lead to another fall, further linked the national security of the United 
States with supporting anti-communist regimes in East Asia. The paranoia is 
primary illustrated by State Department's reasoning that communism “will surely 
spread and will ultimately threaten our own homes” (Matray 4) Korea, being 
geographically sandwiched between the Soviet Union and Communist China, 
while being in the immediate proximity to Japan, was a pivotal region to prevent 
Communist spillover to the Asian continent. An apprehension of this situation is 
noticeable in a way the United States dealt with the aftermath of Korean 
independence from Japan. Before the United States secured surrender from 
Japan, the Soviet army was already in a position geographically to move into 
Korea, when the nearest American forces available for movement into Korea 
were 600 miles away (Back 32). The United States was willing to divide Korea 
with the Soviets precisely because they were afraid that the Soviet army would 
push too far down the Korean peninsula. After the liberation of Korea, the 
United States immediately secured an international guarantee for a complete 
control of South Korea in the form of U.S. military governance (US Imperialist 
45).  
Similar to the U.S. occupation period in Japan, the American Military 
Government in Korea changed the fundamental political landscape of Korea by 
installing “democratic institutions” that suppressed the left. According to Klein, 
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this was guided by an American perception that, “new nations [had] 
emotional urge for a completely independent existence that they constructed 
barriers…to the flow of trade, [which] create a breeding ground for 
communism” (Klein 52). Her analysis was, in fact, not far from the truth. In 
Korea, where the land-holding Yangban class exploited the peasant class for 
centuries, everyday forms of peasant resistance were widespread throughout 
the nation. The situation was exacerbated by the architectonic nature of 
Japanese colonialism, which permitted Korean landlord to retain their holdings 
and encouraged them to, “continue disciplining peasants” (Cumings 151).  
Peasant exploitation in Korea grew into strong populist movements after the 
liberation. In the North, peasant activism translated into an indigenized form of 
socialist revolution that executed sweeping land reforms in 1946 (Armstrong 
32). In the South, however, popular uprisings in 1946 were ruthlessly crushed 
by reactionary forces under the auspices of the American military government. 
Adopting the Japanese model of ruling, the United States found it convenient to 
“reestablish [the] colonial system by restoring to key positions Koreans who had 
collaborated with the Japanese” (Shin 65). In fact, there was nothing 
“democratic” about South Korea's authoritarian regimes that frequently relied on 
the U.S. military and clandestine KCIA operations to suppress dissidents. 
President Rhee Syngman, for example, used National Security Laws to arrest 
members of the National Assembly and frequently utilized the army to suppress 
leftist movements. Rhee ruthlessly crushed leftist movements in areas like 
Cheju Island, where, “one in every five or six citizens in the island 
perished” (Cumings 221). It is important to note that due to the military 
command structure in Korea, where the Korean military was directly 
responsible to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff – not the Korean president – the 
political suppressions were unambiguously a byproduct sanctioned by the 
United States (Back 42). To the United States, supporting the Rhee 
government was widely understood as the only way of securing a sphere of 
pro-Western influence and containing the extension of the Soviet core in Asia.  
The Economics of Intervention  
There was, of course, more at stake in the Cold War for America than 
simple ideological and political struggle. The involvement in Korea also 
incorporated, to a large extent, shrewd economic calculations. Communist 
expansion was a great threat to American political economy, precisely because 
it hindered upon American economic dominance. Americans understood the 
Soviet bloc as an “iron curtain” which was a threat to the American economy 
that relied heavily on free trade with foreign economies (Small 193). The Soviet 
aspiration to become an economic hegemony via closing off its economy was 
an especially frightening concept under the overproduction and under-
consumption thesis, which installed a belief that, “the nation's economy, in 
order to remain healthy, had continually to expand and integrate new markets 
and sources of raw material” (Kramer, “New”). This ideology especially gained 
momentum when conservatives succeeded in linking the Great Depression with 
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a lack of free trade. This was not entirely a false alarm especially in the 
post-war period, since the share of trade in the U.S. economy rose to an 
unprecedented level in the 1950s.  
Many critics point to the lack of “anything” in Korea to deny any claims of 
American economic benefits involved with intervention in Korea. Specifically, 
they refer to the massive U.S. economic and military aid poured into South 
Korea, which peaked at a tune of about $1 billion a year, when the total U.S. 
federal budget was under $70 billion (Woo-Cumings 66). There were, 
nevertheless, economic benefits involved with the generosity. Similar to the 
political economy imperialism, U.S. involvement aimed at not only securing raw 
materials, but also securing cheap labor and markets to sell finished goods 
(Guevara). The American support for pro-capitalist regimes in South Korea 
effectively stifled labor movements for four decades. Korean workers, as Hegan 
Koo puts it, were infamously known for suffering the world's longest work hours 
– up to eighteen hours a day – in some of the most inhumane working 
conditions the world had ever seen (Koo 78). In addition to the strong 
discursive environment that denounced labor movements as “communists,” 
blacklisting labor movement leaders effectively obliterated the collective identity 
of workers. Unsurprisingly, American leverage over the right-wing regimes 
granted the United States exclusive rights to take advantage of such labor 
practices. Namely, South Korea became one of the first nations that the United 
States established a Free Trade Zone, where American businessmen could 
import Koreans good unhindered by domestic rules and regulations (Kramer, 
“Whose”). Free Trade Zones in South Korea emerged in early 1960s as part of 
the First Economic Development Plan, which strikingly correlated with the rise 
of labor-intensive industries in Korea (“Recent”).  
According to classic economic models set forth by trade economists, such 
increase in trade, at an aggregate level, should have benefited both countries 
involved. From a purely economic standpoint, the American involvement in 
Korea, thus invariably benefited Korea. Yet, such premise hardly signifies 
American altruism, because benefiting Korea was the means through which 
Americans benefited. As President Eisenhower articulates, the “flow of U.S. 
dollars abroad would be matched by a corresponding flow of [other goods] into 
the nation” (Klein 42). Many Marxist scholars criticize such unbalanced 
relationship between states, because the capitalist system of world order 
induces the economy of smaller states to inevitably depend on larger 
economies, which is the very logic of imperialism. More importantly, Korea 
served as a primary exemplar that glorified America's reassurance in providing 
a military umbrella for post-colonial nations (Williams et al. 52). The “symbolic” 
model that established America as a reliable bulwark against communism was 
an important American economic strategy that deterred other nations from 
joining the communist movement.  
The Politics of Orientalism  
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The contradictory U.S. foreign policy tactics that emerged during the Cold 
War cannot be explained by a mere U.S. interest in having a stable non-
communist government in the region. After all, scholars do not dispute the 
existence of a genuine American interest in securing the values of democracy. 
Furthermore, the underlying vision behind the “City on a Hill” project implied 
isolationism, where America was to become a separate, untouchable role 
model. The ideologically contradicting intervention in Korea was not only 
legitimized by political and economic interests, but also by the politics of 
Orientalism. Orientalism, by drawing boundaries between being “American” and 
being “other,” effectively alleviated America of its burden to promote freedom in 
other regions.  
According to Edward Said, formation of national identity involves the 
dichotomy of constructing the opposites and others (Said 332). As Christina 
Klein explains it, Orientalism worked as an instrument of Western domination 
by presenting the West as rational and progressive, while portraying the East 
as irrational, backward-looking, and feminine (Klein 10). During the initial period 
after Korea's independence from Japan, mainstream American accounts of 
Korea – which were mainly based on ignorance – established Koreans as a 
“distinct” race by highlighting the binary differences between them and the 
Americans. For example, due to the extreme poverty widespread in Korea, it 
was immediately classified as a, “land mired in traditional and hopeless 
backward values” (Ekbladh). The discourse reinforced the notion of a 
hierarchical relation between the West and the East, giving Americans a 
paternalistic attitude towards Korea. 
This popular understanding, infused with the firm belief that the United 
States was the ultimate solution to mankind's long search for the proper way to 
organize society, compelled American involvement Korea. While the puritan 
ideology indirectly implied an isolationist policy, the “model” community implied 
America being a leader for the world. This is a particularly important concept to 
grasp, because the discourse of idealism and righteousness compelled the 
Americans to get restless in everything that went against this value. As 
Historian Bill Williams puts it, “the behavior of other people was judged by its 
correspondence with the American Way...The weaker the correlation, the 
greater the urge to intervene to help the wayward find the proper path to 
freedom and prosperity” (Williams 53).  
The politics of Orientalism further legitimized the installation of dictators, 
because Americans essentially concluded that Koreans were incapable of 
ruling themselves. This is evident when examining the American literature's 
attitude of the Korean people. One article described Korean men as, “certainly 
the most inefficient of human creatures, lacking all initiative and achievement, 
and the only thing in which he shines is the carrying of burdens on his 
back” (Lee, Sang-Dawn 13).  
An article published in San Francisco Examiner went further by describing 
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Korean food as filth, dirt, indescribable, and highlighting to American 
readers that, “the Korean was so barbarous as to eat dog” (Lee, Sang-Dawn 2). 
Under such arrogant attitudes, any Korean conduct was understood to be 
irrational. In particular, frequent leftist movements in Korea only reassured 
America's judgment that Koreans were indeed illogical. 
Similar to the domestic American racism in the 1950s, which was rooted in 
the discourse that blacks were biologically inferior, early American stereotypes 
of Korea infused the notion that Koreans were innately inferior beings (Sears). 
The best-known American political phrase conveys that, “all men are created 
equal with certain unalienable rights,” yet fundamental rights were denied to 
African Americans because racism categorized blacks to a sub-human 
category. Similarly, while Americans were convinced of the superior nature of 
American democracy, grassroots democratic institutions were not implemented 
in Korea because Americans were convinced that Koreans were not 
“exceptional” enough to rule themselves.  
Conclusion  
South Korea ultimately developed into one of the richest countries in the 
world, after recording world's fastest growth rate for a quarter-century. Many 
developmental economists refer to South Korea's economic “miracle” – contrary 
to North Korea's economic disaster – as a shining example that glorifies the 
ultimate victory of American capitalism. It is precisely that logic in which many 
people hasten to call direct U.S. intervention a function of imperialism. Unlike 
the European model of imperialism, American involvement in Korea ultimately 
benefited both sides. But did it? While Americans did not “colonize” Korea, 
Americans fundamentally altered the historical fate of Korea. It was precisely 
the State Department's paranoia of “Red Expansion” that triggered the division 
of Korea, which created a breeding ground for friction that would develop into 
one of the bloodiest armed conflicts in human history. From conservative 
estimates, the Korean War (1950-1953) was responsible for 3 million deaths, 7 
million displaced civilians, and a permanent division of a five thousand year old 
nation-state (Cumings 293). In the end, it was the Koreans, among other 
citizens of the “hot” regions around the globe, who disproportionately paid the 
price for the Cold War that allowed the United States to secure world 
dominance. The contemporary world, where the residues of Cold War 
discourse and strategies are arrogantly used in regions like Iraq, gives a chilling 
testimony that illuminates the maturity of an “American empire.”  
Appendix 
Figure 1: Mapping the Cold War—the global imaginary of containment. 
(Klein 2003)  
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